The interplay between machine learning and security is becoming more prominent. New applications using machine learning also bring new security risks. Here, we show it is possible to reverseengineer the inputs to a neural network with only a single-shot side-channel measurement assuming the attacker knows the neural network architecture being used.
INTRODUCTION
Today, neural networks are trained on sometimes sensitive data, e.g., in medical and automotive applications. If the adversary can recover those inputs, he/she can violate the privacy of users by learning some private information. We show that the adversary can obtain a significant amount of knowledge by simply observing electromagnetic (EM) emanations while the secret data is being processed. To this end, we perform horizontal side-channel attacks to recover otherwise secret inputs to the network. To our best knowledge, previous works did not consider this direction before.
There are numerous works dealing with the security and privacy issues of machine learning models but approaching them from different angles. Ateniese et al. investigated various machine learning classifiers and statistical information obtained from those classifiers to show that one could infer useful information from those Permission to make digital or hard copies of part or all of this work for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for profit or commercial advantage and that copies bear this notice and the full citation on the first page. Copyrights for third-party components of this work must be honored. For all other uses, contact the owner/author(s). CCS '19, November 11-15, 2019, London, United Kingdom © 2019 Copyright held by the owner/author(s). ACM ISBN 978-1-4503-6747-9/19/11. https://doi.org/10.1145/3319535.3363280 classifiers [2] . Wei et al. performed the attack on an FPGA-based convolutional neural network accelerator where they managed to recover the input image from the collected power traces without knowing the detailed parameters of the neural network [6] . This attack is applicable only when the line buffer executes the convolution operation and requires a substantial number of measurements. Contrasting, our approach is completely generic in its nature and works independently of any implementation optimization.
THREAT MODEL AND MEASUREMENT SETUP
The technique of side-channel analysis (SCA) for key recovery attacks is well known in cryptography. Horizontal Power Analysis (HPA) is a special type of side-channel attack using power (or electromagnetic emanation) as the source of leakage [4] . While some other SCAs recover the secret key statistically over multiple measurements, HPA is a single trace attack exploiting the similarity between operations and/or data within a single trace (and accordingly single algorithm execution).
Recently, Machine Learning as a Service (MLaaS) emerged as a rising business model with large companies like Google and Amazon. A variety of services are offered ranging from training infrastructure, datasets, pre-trained models, etc. Resource-intensive datasets are often trained on cloud infrastructures and pre-trained models can be downloaded on small embedded nodes for field testing. MLaaS is deployed as an API and can be black-box or white-box based on the provider [1] . Previous works have shown that making the API black-box does not necessarily help as model learning attacks can reveal the hidden internals [5] . Here, we consider an adversary aiming at recovering the sensitive input fed to a previously trained neural network for classification.
We use the multilayer perceptron (MLP) algorithm since it is an often used machine learning algorithm in modern applications. We have no assumption on the type of inputs or its source, as we work with floating-point numbers. If the inputs are in the form of integers, the attack becomes easier since we do not need to recover mantissa bytes and deal with precision. The adversary is only capable of acquiring side-channel measurements from the device in a passive manner, without any perturbation with the device operation. The underlying neural network architecture is public and all the weights are known. The crucial information for this work are the weights of the first layer. These weights can be obtained through a sidechannel attack [3] or in settings where a certain neural network is derived from known networks by e.g., transfer learning. The measurement setup consists of the device under test (DUT), sampling oscilloscope, electromagnetic probes, and pre-amplifiers for the attack. The DUT tested is ARM Cortex-M3. ARM microcontrollers form a fair share of the current market with a huge dominance in mobile applications, but also seeing rapid adoption in markets like IoT, automotive, virtual and augmented reality, etc. The microcontroller in our experiments, ARM Cortex-M3, is widely used in commercial products like wearable and hardware wallets. The side-channel measurements are collected during the execution of the classification and they are captured using the Lecroy WaveRunner 610zi oscilloscope. The oscilloscope measurements are synchronized with the operations by common handshaking signals like start and stop of computation. To improve the quality of measurements, we find the ideal position for the probe based on some cryptographic algorithm running for the benchmark and we use a 30 dB pre-amplifier. An RF-U 5-2 near-field electromagnetic (EM) probe from Langer is used to collect the measurements (see Figure 1a ). The setup is depicted in Figure 1b .
For different platforms, the leakage model could change, but this would not limit our approach and methodology. The Hamming Weight (HW) is the popular leakage model for ARM Cortex-M3 [3] and can be easily adapted for a different device.
SINGLE SHOT INPUT RECOVERY ATTACK
It can be extremely complex to recover the input by observing outputs from a known network. It involves several classifications in order to solve a system of equations, while some of the functions might not be invertible, i.e., ReLU activation function. When considering theoretical attacks, the system of equations can become unmanageable as the architecture of the network becomes complex.
The proposed attack targets the multiplication operation in the first hidden layer. The main target is the multiplication m = x ·w of a known weight w with a secret input x. Using the Hamming Weight (HW) model, the adversary correlates the activity of the predicted output m for all hypothesis of the input x. Pearson's correlation can be used to distinguish correct input from the side-channel measurements. Thus, the attack computes ρ(t, x), for all hypothesis of the input x, where ρ is the Pearson correlation coefficient and t is the side-channel measurement. The correct value of the input x will result in a higher correlation standing out from all other wrong hypotheses x * , given enough measurements. Although the attack concept is known and well tested for attacking cryptographic algorithms, the method must be adapted for targeting floating-point numbers in neural networks rather than fixed length integers in cryptographic algorithm.
A 32-bit floating point number in IEEE 754 format consist of: 1 sign bit (b 31 ), 8 biased exponent bits (b 30 ...b 23 ), and 23 mantissa (fractional) bits (b 22 ...b 0 ). This can be formulated as:
The trace t is measured when the computed result m is stored back to the memory, leaking in the HW model, i.e., HW (m). By recovering this representation, it is enough to recover the estimation of the floating-point value. When attacking floating-point numbers, small precision errors due to rounding off the intermediate values still result in useful information. For the attack, we can target the mantissa multiplication operation directly. In this case, the search space can either be [0, 2 32 − 1] to cover all possible values for all 32 bits (hence, more computational resources will be required) or we can focus only on the most significant bits of the mantissa (fewer candidates but also with smaller precision). Since the sign and exponent bits are fixed, we can aim to target only a smaller subset of mantissa bits, focusing only on the most significant bits and assigning the rest to 0. Thus, our search space is now [0, 2 9+n − 1], where n is a number of significant bits targeted. The algorithm for recovering one input value is given in Algorithm 1. It is executed once for every input value, while the same measurements are re-used. The whole attack comprises of one online measurement and the number of offline attacks equals the number of input values.
Still, this attack faces a strong limitation. As x changes from one measurement (input) to another, information learned from one measurement cannot be used with another measurement, preventing any statistical analysis over a set of different inputs. Then, the adversary is forced to exploit all the measurements from a single measurement. To perform information exploitation over a single measurement, we perform a horizontal attack. The weights in the first hidden layer are all multiplied with the same input x, one after the other. M multiplications, corresponding to M different weights (or neurons) in the first hidden layer are isolated. An illustrative example is shown in Figure 2 where M = 4 traces corresponds to 4 weights from a single trace. A single trace is cut into M smaller traces, each one corresponding to one multiplication with a known associated weight. The value of the input is statistically inferred by applying a Pearson's correlation on the M smaller traces. Drawing analogy with cryptographic algorithms, several known plaintexts (weights in case of an MLP) are processed for a single unknown key (input x). An input recovery attack was proposed in [6] , which Algorithm 1: Calculate the sorted candidates for an input x.
Require: ARRAY T: set of traces, ARRAY W: set of weights corresponding to input i, n: precision (up to 23 bit exponent), f F LO AT , f I E E E : function to convert floating-point to IEEE binary representation and vice versa, HW: function to calculate the Hamming weight, corr: function to calculate absolute correlation between two arrays Ensure: ARRAY I: sorted possible candidates for input x 1: C = [] 2: for int k: 0 to 2 9+n − 1 do 3:
# calculate the Hamming weight of the hypothesis 7: C = cor r (M HW , T ) 8:
# calculate the correlation between the traces and hypothesis 9:
C.append(max(C)) 10:
# get the max correlation value 11: end for 12: C = f F LO AT ([C | 0 23−n ]) 13: I = sort(C) 14: # Sort the correlation and return descending sorted index. 15: return X; Figure 3 : Correlation comparison between correct and incorrect inputs for target value 2.453. requires multiple traces targeting a line buffer, which is an optimization oriented design choice. Differing from that, our proposed attack targets the generic multiplication in a single trace setting.
The attack targets the multiplication in the input layer to recover the secret input. Depending on the microcontroller, the multiplication can be processed by ALU or dedicated floating-point units. To avoid the discrepancy of the difference of multiplication operation, we target the output of multiplication. In other words, we target the point when the resultant product of target multiplication is updated in general purpose registers or memory, which happens irrespective of underlying multiplication implementation. Figure 3 shows the success of attack recovering secret input of 2.453, with known weights. We consider the attack successful if the recovered input is correct up to two decimal places (2.45 in this case). ARM Cortex-M3 has a complex architecture and would result in a lower SNR on side-channel measurement. Still, the attack is shown to be practical with 500 neurons. Given a platform, any network with 500 nodes in the input layer is vulnerable to input recovery attacks. Similarly, setup and number of measurements can be updated for other targets like FPGA, GPU, etc. We applied the single shot input recovery attack on the publicly available MNIST database, which consists of images of handwritten digits. Each image is a matrix of 28 × 28 pixels, each pixel ∈ [0, 255]. We normalized the dataset to have floating-point numbers between 0 and 1. Our neural network architecture (with 500 neurons in the first layer) on ARM Cortex-M3 was trained with the MNIST database and then tested for classification on test data. The test dataset consists of 10 000 images. We selected 10 images, with one image corresponding to each digit ∈ [0, 9]. The input recovery is performed on a single trace each time, up to 2 decimal places given the adopted precision error. The original and retrieved images with an allowed precision error are shown in Figure 4 (results for [6, 9] not shown), demonstrating the effectiveness of the attack. We emphasize that our attack does not depend on the type of the input and as such can be applied to any input type.
CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
We demonstrate a single trace input recovery attack on MLP. The attack targets the input multiplication of secret input with known weights, exploited horizontally within a single computation. The success probability of the attack increases for networks with larger input layer, which is trending in modern neural network architectures. Obvious countermeasures thwarting side-channel attacks, like shuffling, hiding or masking can be applied. As countermeasures come with overhead, this might not be acceptable for some applications and motivates research for optimal countermeasures.
